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Committee Chair’s Majority Partisan Status and Its Effect on Information 
Transmission via Hearings  
While US Congress assigns only the members of a majority party to committee chairs, 
some state legislatures and other legislative bodies using a proportional representation 
system also consider members of a minority party for the position to promote a bipartisan 
policy making practice.
 
Although previous literature investigates the effects of bipartisan 
rules and practices exploiting such institutional variations, the informational benefit of 
having a minority partisan committee chair has not been explored. By extending a
 
recent 





chair’s majority partisan status
 
on information acquisition and transmission via committee 
hearings. Findings suggest that under some conditions, the
 
floor can informationally 
benefit more from having
 
a chair representing a
 
minority party in the chamber with 










Some US state legislatures introduced rules and norms of procedures that promote bipartisan 
policy-making to help the minority party better represented (e.g. neutralizing committee chairs’ 
agenda setting power by requiring all bills to be heard or reported to the floor, or diffusing such 
power to members of the minority party).1 Scholars have shown that the measures neutralizing 
 
1 “Best Practices for Collaborative Policymaking” by Bipartisan Policy Center. 
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/fairvote/pages/611/attachments/original/1450119526/Bes
t-Practices-for-Collaborative-Policymaking.pdf?1450119526 
This is an original manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in the Journal of Legislative Studies on 02 Dec 2019, available
online at http://doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2019.1697046
Ju Yeon Park, School of Computing and Information, University of Pittsburgh
2 
 
agenda-setting power at committee-level tend to enhance legislatures’ bipartisan collaboration 
(Anzia & Jackman, 2013; Cox et al., 2010), efficiency (Martorano, 2004) and productivity 
(Jackman, 2014). However, the effect of appointing a minority partisan committee chair has 
received relatively less attention. Furthermore, the informational benefit of such measures has 
not been studied yet. Thus, this research note investigates whether having members of the 
minority party chair a committee helps the committee better function as an information mediator 
for the floor under certain conditions.  
While minority party members do not chair committees in the US Congress, there are 
some instances that US state legislatures assign members of a minority party as committee chairs 
(Hedlund & Hamm, 1996),2 and it is more common in proportional representation systems (e.g. 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland) where 
the rules of procedures explicitly require committee chairs’ positions to be proportionately 
shared by parties sitting in the parliament (Powell & Whitten, 1993). 
 A committee chair who is a member of the majority party, which I call a “majority chair,” 
often possesses extensive authority over a legislative decision-making process within a 
 
2 In their study of political parties in US state legislative committees, the authors report that in 98 
chambers during the 1977-8 session, 28 out of the 1,643 committee chairs (1.7 per cent) were 
members of a minority party. These cases are mostly from the following six chambers – the 
Senates in Alaska, California, Tennessee and Vermont, and the lower houses in California and 
Vermont, and their mean percentage of committees with a minority chair was 25.6 per cent. 
During the 1989-90 session, they find that the percentage of minority chairs increased three-fold 
to 5.1 per cent.  
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committee (Cox & McCubbins, 2005; De Gregorio, 1992). For example, he can set committee 
agenda by deciding whether to hear a bill or not and has a great deal of discretion over the 
selection of witnesses to testify in hearings.  
On the other hand, despite being a chair of a committee, the ability of a chair who is a 
member of the minority party, which I call a “minority chair,” to move his bills forward can be 
limited in two dimensions. First, a minority chair is less likely to secure a majority vote support 
in his favor on divisive policy issues within a committee as well as on the floor than a majority 
chair. In such cases, the chair’s agenda-setting power significantly weakens (Evans, 1991, p. 53). 
Second, although legislative chambers often specify a minority party’s right to call witnesses in 
their rules of procedures to ensure the minority’s representation, the extent of such right of a 
minority chair is unlikely to be as great as that of a majority chair. For example, the German 
Bundestag allows minority members to call witnesses when they request a hearing; however, if a 
committee limits the number of witnesses, they can call a proportion of persons to be heard 
corresponding to their relative strength in the committee (Rule 70-(2)).3 
Given the differences between a majority chair and a minority chair in their amount of 
discretion over agenda-control and hearing procedures, the chair’s majority partisan status can be 
an important factor affecting his decision to hold a hearing, the nature of the hearing, and its 
outcomes. Therefore, this research note investigates when each of a majority chair and a minority 
 
3 The US Congress has a similar rule such that minority members of a committee can invite 
witnesses for at least one day of hearings when majority of them sends a written request to the 
chairman (RULE XI, 2(j)(1) in the House, and Rule XXVI, paragraph 4(d) in the Senate). 
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chair holds a hearing and how informative the hearings that each one holds are. To do so, I 
utilize and extend the theoretical model on committee decision-making by Park (2017).  
Park (2017)’s model is especially suitable for this study for the following reasons. First, 
while other existent informational models (e.g. Diermeier & Feddersen, 2000; Gilligan & 
Krehbiel, 1987) assume a committee as a unitary actor, her model assumes a committee 
composed of two members with heterogeneous preferences with one representing a majority 
party and the other representing a minority party. Although Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989) also 
assume heterogenous committee members, the resource disparity between the members, which is 
unique in her model, makes it readily available to compare the case where the majority member 
chairs the committee to the case where his minority counterpart does so.  
Second, her model incorporates electoral incentives of committee members to use 
hearings for political grandstanding which was absent in the existent informational models but 
considered one of the major goals that members pursue during hearings in empirical 
congressional studies (De Gregorio, 1992; Huitt, 1954; Park, 2019). Thus, each member can 
choose to commit their resources to either information-seeking or grandstanding or even to a 
mixture of them if one has enough resources to allocate to both, and these decisions are 
symbolized to choosing witnesses of different types: an informative one and a political one. In 
this way, her model allows the level of information transmitted in hearings to be endogenously 
determined by committee members, rather than exogenously given as in other models, making it 
possible to test the informational benefit of varying institutions at a more precise scale.  
 This research note not only extends the informational models of committees and the 
scholarship examining the effect of introducing bipartisan rules to the legislative procedures as 
discussed above, but it also contributes to the following strands of literature. First, it contributes 
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to the previous works studying various factors affecting the extent of information transmission in 
committee hearings – such as committee types (DeGregorio, 1992; Evans, 1991; Park, 2019), 
policy preferences of committee members and the floor pivot, the political salience of the issue 
(Park, 2017) and chair’s seniority and ideological extremism (Kasniunas, 2011) – by introducing 
a new explanatory factor: the chair’s majority partisan status. 
Second, it extends the literature on the role of chairs and interactions between majority 
and minority members within a committee (DeGregorio, 1992; Evans, 1991) by systematically 
theorizing the incentive structure and institutional constraints using a formal model which has 
often been illustrated in anecdotal case studies and by additionally considering a case with a 
minority chair which has rarely been discussed.  
The next section briefly summarizes Park’s model setup and theoretical predictions and 
then further solve for a minority chair’s hearing decisions, which was absent in the original 
model, to compare the decisions of a majority chair and a minority chair and the informativeness 
of hearings that each one holds.   
 
Model 
The model assumes two possible states of nature 𝑠 = {0, 1} with the true state unknown. 
However, there is a prior belief that 𝑃(𝑠 = 0) = .5, which is common knowledge. Also, suppose 
there exist two policy alternatives 𝑥 ∈ {0, 1}.  
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 The game is played by three strategic actors: the principal (F) and two members of a 
standing committee, R and B. Either of the members serves as a chair of the committee.4 It is 
assumed that all players try to maximize von Neumann Morgenstern expected utility. 
Each committee member’s utility is shaped by a combination of two components: 
policy-based utility and political utility. First, the policy-based utility, 𝑢𝑖(𝑥, 𝑠) for 𝑖 ∈ {𝑅, 𝐵}, is 
determined by the true state, the policy implemented, and their identity: 
𝑢𝑅,𝐹(𝑥, 𝑠) {
1,            𝑖𝑓 𝑥 = 𝑠 = 0
1 − 𝑑,    𝑖𝑓 𝑥 = 𝑠 = 1
0,            𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒   
               𝑢𝐵(𝑥, 𝑠) {
1,            𝑖𝑓 𝑥 = 𝑠 = 1
1 − 𝑑,    𝑖𝑓 𝑥 = 𝑠 = 0
0,            𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒   
 
(0 ≤ 𝑑 ≤ 1). 
Here, d captures the level of policy disagreement between the two members such that 
when d > 0, R prefers policy 0 ex ante, and B prefers policy 1. Below presents the expected 
policy-based utility for a member: 
                                 𝐸(𝑢𝑖(𝑥, 𝑠)) = ∑ {𝑢𝑖(𝑥, 𝑠) ∗ 𝑃(𝑥|𝑠)}𝑥∈𝑋 
𝑠∈𝑆 
,   for 𝑖 ∈ {𝑅, 𝐵}.                          (1) 
Second, the political utility, 𝑢𝑖(𝑎𝑖), is the number of advocates (𝑎𝑖) that each individual 
member invites multiplied by 𝑞 ≥ 0 which represents the marginal benefit of inviting an 
advocate and is assumed to be exogenously determined. 
                                                     𝑢𝑖(𝑎𝑖) = 𝑎𝑖 ∗ 𝑞,  for 𝑖 ∈ {𝑅, 𝐵}                                              (2) 
(0 ≤ 𝑞) 
 
4 Note that although the model assumes a two-party competition, it can be applied to a multi-




There is a cost (c) that each committee member has to pay when a hearing is held since 
the committee members have to invest their limited time and resources to participate in a 
hearing. Thus, if a hearing is held, the expected utility for a committee member is as below:   
                             𝐸𝑈𝑖 = ∑ {𝑢𝑖(𝑥, 𝑠) ∗ 𝑃(𝑥|𝑠)}𝑥∈𝑋 
𝑠∈𝑆 
+ 𝑢𝑖(𝑎𝑖) − 𝑐,  for 𝑖 ∈ {𝑅, 𝐵}.                    (3) 
If a hearing is not held, it reduces just to the expected policy-based utility.  
The intuition behind this setup of the committee member’s expected utility is as follows. 
First, policy-based utility provides the committee members with an incentive to seek for policy-
relevant information. This incentive reduces as their policy preferences diverge from each other.  
Second, political utility motivates a member to grandstand in a hearing. In practice, a 
member can grandstand by making statements promoting his own view, by inviting witnesses 
whose testimony will advocate his view, or by inviting his political opponent as a witness in 
order to publicly criticize her. However, this set of behaviors are simplified as inviting an 
advocate in the model. By grandstanding, a member may send political messages to affect the 
public perception in his favor and eventually garner electoral gains. The political value of 
grandstanding can be determined by myriads of factors, including the issue salience for example. 
Thus, the model assumes that the marginal benefit of inviting an advocate (q) to be exogenously 
given.   
Often the floor pivot, the principal that legislative committees report to, is not completely 
indifferent between policy alternatives but rather has preference for one policy over the other ex 
ante. This is more so on a policy issue on which floor members are highly polarized. To address 





The game proceeds in the following order:  
1. Nature chooses the state of the world with known probability .5. 
2. The chair of the committee decides whether to hold a hearing or not at a cost. 
3. If a hearing is held, both members of the committee simultaneously select witnesses from 
three information groups.  
4. Each of the selected witnesses sends a public message to the committee members and the 
principal. 
5. With or without a hearing, the principal selects a policy based on the information she has, 
and payoffs are realized. 
If a hearing is held, I assume that R has to invite two witnesses and B invites one. Thus, 
R is considered a majority member, and B a minority member. The reason for restricting the total 
number of witnesses to be invited to three is because it is the smallest possible number that 
makes one person invites more witnesses than the other so that the equilibrium solution is 
derived in the simplest fashion without loss of generality.5 
The committee members can invite witnesses from three interest groups: Red, Blue, and 
Green. When a witness is called, she sends a message, 𝑚𝑥 with 𝑥 ∈ {0, 1}, supporting either of 
the two policy alternatives. I assume that Red witnesses always send a message in favor of policy 
0, and Blues in favor of policy 1. However, Greens send a message that matches the true state 
with probability θ, given . 5 < 𝜃 ≤ 1. Thus, θ is the level of accuracy of the Green witnesses. 
Therefore, prior to learning the true state of the world at the end of the game, Greens are 
 
5 I tried other larger numbers of witnesses with one person inviting more witnesses than the 
other, but the major implications of the model remain almost the same. 
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considered a neutral information source whereas Reds and Blues are biased. All players are 
assumed to be aware of different information quality of the three groups of witnesses. The 
witnesses in this model are non-strategic actors. 
The witness selection stage in this model symbolizes committee members’ strategic 
commitment of their resources to either or a combination of two different types of behavior they 
can choose from when participating in a hearing: information-seeking and grandstanding. Such a 
commitment choice is modeled as selecting either an informative witness or an advocacy type, 
and the number of witnesses each member can call represents the asymmetric amount of 
discretion that each of a majority member and a minority member possesses over hearing 
procedures.6  
Because the member R prefers policy 0 and B prefers policy 1 whenever 𝑑 > 0, we can 
consider Red witnesses as advocates for R and Blues as advocates for B. Indeed, the equilibrium 
will solve that R does not invite any Blues and B does not invite any Reds since these strategies 
are strongly dominated. Let 𝑎𝑅 be the number of Reds invited; 𝑎𝐵 the number of Blues invited; 
𝑔𝑖, for 𝑖 ∈ {𝑅, 𝐵}, the number of Greens invited by the member i such that 𝑔 = 𝑔𝑅 + 𝑔𝐵. Then, 
R invites 𝑔𝑅 + 𝑎𝑅 number of witnesses which is two, and B invites 𝑔𝐵 + 𝑎𝐵 which should be 
one.  
At the final stage of the game, the principal chooses one policy alternative with or 
without information collected from a hearing. If a hearing is not held, she always chooses policy 
 
6 Therefore, the witnesses are assumed to be a non-strategic actor although treating them as 
strategic actors may extend the model highlighting other interesting aspects on the interactions 
between the members and witnesses. 
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0. If a hearing is held, she decides based on the Greens’ messages which will update her 
posterior belief about the state.  
For the equilibrium solution, backwards induction and the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 
are used. Solutions and proofs are provided in the online appendix. Now I explain equilibrium 
strategies and comparative statics. 
First, the principal’s policy decision is made as follows. Let 𝑔𝑚 be the number of Greens 
sending a message 𝑚 ∈ {0,1}, such that 𝑔 = 𝑔0 + 𝑔1. Since the principal is biased in favor of 
policy 0 by d, if a hearing is not held, the principal always selects policy 0. When a hearing is 
held, she selects policy 0, if 𝑔0 ≥ 𝑔1, or if 𝑔0 < 𝑔1 and 𝑑 > 1 − (
𝜃
1−𝜃
)(𝑔0−𝑔1); and policy 1, 
otherwise. However, if she is indifferent about choosing either of the policies, she randomizes 
her choice with .5 probability.  
Second, if a hearing is held, there are three types of pure-strategy equilibria for witness 
selection which translate to three different types of hearings. First, R invites two Reds, and B 
invites a Blue. This equilibrium is labeled as ‘NG’ meaning no Greens and implies a hearing 
where all committee members grandstand. Second, R invites two Greens, and B also invites a 
Green. This equilibrium is labeled as ‘AG’ meaning all Greens and stands for a fully informative 
hearing. The third type is characterized as a partially informative hearing in which only one 
Green is invited in total of three witnesses. This includes two equilibria: One in which R invites 
one Green and one Red, and B invites a Blue; the other in which R invites two Reds, and B 
invites a Green. The former is labeled as ‘SG1’ and the latter as ‘SG2,’ and here SG means some 
Greens.  
Let ∆𝑃(𝑛) be the marginal probability of implementing a correct policy by inviting the 
nth number of one additional Green witness such that ∆𝑃(𝑛) ≡ 𝑃(𝑥 = 𝑠| 𝑔 = 𝑛) −
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𝑃(𝑥 = 𝑠| 𝑔 = 𝑛 − 1); 𝜑 the probability that the principal chooses policy 0 even if 𝑔0 < 𝑔1 such 
that 𝜑 ≡ 𝑃(𝑑 > 1 − (
𝜃
1−𝜃
)(𝑔0−𝑔1)|𝑔0 < 𝑔1); 𝜑𝑔 the value of 𝜑 when the total number of Greens 
invited is 𝑔; and 𝜆 ≡ (1 −
1
2
𝑑) for notational brevity.  
Each of the three equilibria exist under the following conditions: NG if 𝑞 ≥
(1 − 𝜑1) (𝜃𝜆 −
1−𝑑
2
); AG if 𝑞 ≤
∆𝑃(3)∗𝜆(1−𝜑)
2
; SG1 if 𝑞 ≤ (1 − 𝜑1) (𝜃𝜆 −
1−𝑑
2
); SG2 if 
∆𝑃(3)∗𝜆(1−𝜑)
2
≤ 𝑞 ≤ (1 − 𝜑1) (𝜃𝜆 −
1−𝑑
2
). Figure 1 summarizes the three equilibria of witness 
selection as a function of q and d assuming 𝜃 = .8 and also marks the expected hearing decisions 
by a committee chair which will now be explained.  
 Third, the model predicts that a majority chair holds a hearing if 𝑝 (1 −
1
2
𝑑) (1 − 𝜑) +
𝜑
2
+ 𝑎𝑅 ∗ 𝑞 − .5 > 𝑐; a minority chair holds a hearing if 𝑝 (1 −
1
2







> 𝑐; and both chairs hold a hearing with .5 probability when indifferent. Thus, a 
majority chair is more likely to hold a hearing than a minority chair if 2𝑞(𝑎𝑅 − 𝑎𝐵) > 𝑑(1 − 𝜑). 
The value of φ is either 0 or 1 depending on the size of 𝑔0,  𝑔1 and 𝑑 (See online appendix for 
computation of φ). When φ = 1, the majority chair is more likely to hold a hearing if 𝑎𝑅 > 𝑎𝐵 
which is satisfied when SG2 or NG is expected in the next stage. If φ = 0, the chair’s hearing 
decision also depends on q and d. For example, if d is low and q is high enough and either SG2 
or NG is expected (𝑎𝑅 > 𝑎𝐵), then a majority chair is more likely to hold a hearing than a 
minority chair. However, if q is low enough so that AG or SG1 is likely to occur (𝑎𝑅 = 𝑎𝐵), then 
a minority chair is more likely to hold a hearing than a majority chair.  
These comparative statics make two interesting points. One is that a minority chair has a 
stronger incentive to hold a hearing as the benefit of inviting an advocate (q) becomes trivial and 
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the level of disagreement (d) increases to some extent. More intuitively, when the majority 
member has less motivation for a hearing because the principal shares the common view, the 
minority would want to hold a hearing and let a Green witness testify. That is because inviting at 
least one Green may dramatically increase the chances of implementing the minority’s preferred 
policy if the Green testifies in support of that policy while not holding a hearing will completely 
rule out this possibility. 
The other more interesting implication is that a majority chair has a stronger incentive to 
hold a hearing when he intends to grandstand in a hearing without calling a Green himself (SG2 
or NG) while the hearings that a minority chair is more likely to hold tend to be either fully or 
partially informative (AG or SG1). Thus, the majority chair’s relatively stronger incentive to 
hold a hearing whenever it exists is mainly driven by his incentive to grandstand, reap private 
benefits, and in case of SG2, let the minority member provide the information which serves as 
public goods. In contrast, a minority chair’s unilateral decision to hold a hearing is driven by 
information-seeking incentive which benefits all. Table 1 summarizes a chair’s decision to hold a 
hearing depending on his party’s majority status and the expected selection of witnesses 
assuming 𝑐 = .2 and 𝜃 = .8 to be consistent with Figure 1. 
Figure 1 displays point predictions of both majority and minority chairs’ hearing 
decisions. In most of the equilibrium space, both types of chairs hold a hearing. However, when 
𝑞 < .1 and 𝑑 > .75, neither holds a hearing. If . 1 < 𝑞 < .2 and 𝑑 > .75, which corresponds to 
the space marked as (A), only a majority chair holds a hearing, and the resulting hearing will be 
intended for grandstanding. On the other hand, only a minority chair holds a hearing in a 
triangular space marked as (B) where SG1 or SG2 is expected and 𝑞 < .2𝑑 − .05, or in a 
rectangular space marked also as (B) where AG or SG1 is expected and . 438 < 𝑑. Therefore, 
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this pattern confirms the most interesting and somewhat counterintuitive prediction of this 
research note: When a principal is moderately biased in favor of the majority member of a 
committee, having a minority chair as opposed to a majority chair is likely to help the principal 
make a more informed policy decision. 
In addition, I also solved the model assuming a neutral principal that is indifferent 
between two policy alternative ex ante. Findings suggest that there are situations where only a 
majority chair holds a hearing, and such a hearing will be either partially informative (SG2) or 
uninformative (NG) at all. However, experimental evidence from Park discounts the possibility 
of the former, which implies that having a majority chair is likely to increase the frequency of 




This research note explored which of the majority and minority committee chairs is more likely 
to hold an informative hearing under various conditions and provides new theoretical arguments 
about the informational role of committees as follows. When a floor pivot is biased in favor of 
the majority member of a committee there are some conditions in which only a minority chair 
holds a hearing while a majority chair does not, and that hearing is likely to be informative, 
which is unexpected and surprising. However, when only a majority chair holds a hearing, the 
hearing tends to be full of grandstanding. Similarly, when a floor pivot is unbiased, hearings that 
only a majority chair holds is likely to be used for grandstanding.  
Therefore, this study makes an important, practical suggestion to legislative bodies with 
committees that assigning committee chairmanship to minority party members can be 
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institutionally desirable not only for the representation of minority voice but also for the 
efficiency of the institution through enhanced information transmission.  
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Table 1. Chairs’ Hearing Decisions 
 
Expected Witness Selection R chair holds a hearing if …  B chair holds a hearing if … 
NG 𝑞 > .1 𝑞 > .2 
AG 𝑑 < .438 𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑠 
SG1 𝑞 > .4𝑑 − .1  𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑠 
SG2 𝑞 > .2𝑑 − .05  𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑠 
Note: The utilities are calculated assuming c = .2 and 𝜃 = .8 to be consistent with Figure 1. If a chair is indifferent, 






















Figure 1. Equilibria for Witness Selection and a Chair’s Hearing Decision 
 















Online Supporting Material 
Equilibrium Solution for the Model with a Neutral Principal 
Here, I present theoretical predictions assuming a neutral principal. By being neutral, I mean that 
a principal prefers implementing a policy that matches the true state of the world such that she 
receives utility of 1 if the chosen policy matches the state and 0 otherwise.  
𝑢𝐹(𝑥, 𝑠) = {
1,    𝑖𝑓 𝑥 = 𝑠     
0,   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
 
The equilibrium solution of the model is presented here using backwards induction. The 
equilibrium strategies for each stage of the game are defined as follows. First, for 𝑖 ∈ { 𝑅, 𝐵}, let 
ℎ∗(∙) be a chair’s equilibrium strategy for a hearing decision and it maximizes 𝐸𝑈𝑖. I denote 
ℎ∗ = 1 for holding a hearing and 0 otherwise. Second, 𝑙𝑖
∗(∙ |𝑙~𝑖, ℎ
∗(∙)) is a committee member i’s 
equilibrium strategy for witness selection that maximizes 𝐸𝑈𝑖, if a hearing is held. Third, let G 
represent a set of messages from the Green group. Then, 𝑓∗(∙ | 𝐺, ℎ∗(∙)) is the principal’s 
equilibrium strategy on a policy decision and maximizes 𝐸𝑈𝑓, given the chair’s hearing decision 
and messages from Green witnesses, if any.   
1. Policy decision by the principal 
If a hearing is not held, the principal randomizes the policy decision based on her prior 
belief about the state between two alternatives: 𝑃(𝑠 = 0) = .5. If a hearing is held, the principal 
will choose a policy in the following manner: 
𝑓∗(∙ |ℎ∗ = 1)= {
𝑥 = 0,    𝑖𝑓   𝐸𝑈𝐹(𝑥 = 0|𝐺, ℎ
∗ = 1) > 𝐸𝑈𝐹(𝑥 = 1|𝐺, ℎ
∗ = 1)
𝑥 = 1,    𝑖𝑓   𝐸𝑈𝐹(𝑥 = 0|𝐺, ℎ
∗ = 1) < 𝐸𝑈𝐹(𝑥 = 1|𝐺, ℎ
∗ = 1)
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒,    𝑖𝑓   𝐸𝑈𝐹(𝑥 = 0|𝐺, ℎ






Below is the principal’s expected utility for each policy decision: 
𝐸𝑈𝐹(𝑥 = 0|𝐺, ℎ
∗ = 1) = 𝑃(𝑠 = 0|𝐺) ∗ 1 + 𝑃(𝑠 = 1|𝐺) ∗ 0 
𝐸𝑈𝐹(𝑥 = 1|𝐺, ℎ
∗ = 1) = 𝑃(𝑠 = 0|𝐺) ∗ 0 + 𝑃(𝑠 = 1|𝐺) ∗ 1. 
Now, I present posterior beliefs about the state of the world (s) after receiving the 
messages from the Green groups (G). Given 𝑚 ∈ {0,1}, suppose that 𝑔𝑚 is the number of Green 
witnesses sending a message, m, such that 𝑔 = 𝑔0 + 𝑔1. First of all, suppose that the probability 
of receiving certain combination of Greens’ messages given each state is 
𝑃(𝐺|𝑠 = 0) = (
𝑔
𝑔0
) 𝜃𝑔0  (1 − 𝜃)𝑔1 ≡ 𝛼 
𝑃(𝐺|𝑠 = 1) = (
𝑔
𝑔1
) 𝜃𝑔1 (1 − 𝜃)𝑔0 ≡ 𝛽. 
Then, the posterior beliefs are 
𝑃(𝑠 = 0|𝐺) =
𝑃(𝐺|𝑠 = 0) ∗ 𝑃(𝑠 = 0)
𝑃(𝐺|𝑠 = 0) ∗ 𝑃(𝑠 = 0) + 𝑃(𝐺|𝑠 = 1) ∗ 𝑃(𝑠 = 1)
=
. 5𝛼
. 5(𝛼 + 𝛽)
 
𝑃(𝑠 = 1|𝐺) =
𝑃(𝐺|𝑠 = 1) ∗ 𝑃(𝑠 = 1)
𝑃(𝐺|𝑠 = 0) ∗ 𝑃(𝑠 = 0) + 𝑃(𝐺|𝑠 = 1) ∗ 𝑃(𝑠 = 1)
=
. 5𝛽
. 5(𝛼 + 𝛽)
. 
Given that, the principal always selects policy 0 if the following is satisfied: 
𝐸𝑈𝐹(𝑥 = 0|𝐺, ℎ
∗ = 1) > 𝐸𝑈𝐹(𝑥 = 1|𝐺, ℎ
∗ = 1) 




) 𝜃𝑔0  (1 − 𝜃)𝑔1 > (
𝑔
𝑔1
)𝜃𝑔1  (1 − 𝜃)𝑔0 
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                                                                       (
𝜃
1 − 𝜃
)(𝑔0−𝑔1) > 1.                                                         (1) 
Since . 5 < 𝜃 < 1, (
𝜃
1−𝜃
) > 1. Therefore, if a hearing is held, the equilibrium strategy for 
the principal is to implement policy 0 when 𝑔0 > 𝑔1 and policy 1 when 𝑔0 < 𝑔1. However, even 
when a hearing is held, if 𝑔0 = 𝑔1, the principal will randomize her policy choice with .5 
probability.   
𝑓∗(∙ |ℎ∗ = 1) = {
𝑥∗ = 0,    𝑖𝑓 𝑔0 > 𝑔1
𝑥∗ = 1,    𝑖𝑓 𝑔0 < 𝑔1
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒,    𝑖𝑓 𝑔0 = 𝑔1
 
2. Witness selection by committee members 
Let p be the probability of implementing a policy that matches the state of nature. Then, 
the policy-based utility is 




= .5{𝑢𝑖(0,0) ∗ 𝑝 + 𝑢𝑖(1,0) ∗ (1 − 𝑝) + 𝑢𝑖(0,1) ∗ (1 − 𝑝) + 𝑢𝑖(1,1) ∗ 𝑝}. 
Given  𝑢𝑖(1,0) = 𝑢𝑖(0,1) = 0, the policy-based utility for each committee member 
reduces to 
                      ∑ {𝑢𝑖(𝑥, 𝑠) ∗ 𝑃(𝑥|𝑠)}𝑥∈𝑋 
𝑠∈𝑆 
=  𝑝 (1 −
1
2
𝑑).                   (2) 
If a hearing is held, the expected utility of a committee member is composed of the 




           𝐸𝑈𝑖 = 𝑝 (1 −
1
2
𝑑) + 𝑎𝑖 ∗ 𝑞 − 𝑐,  for 𝑖 ∈ {𝑅, 𝐵}.               (3) 
If a hearing is held, R chooses two witnesses in any combination of Greens and Reds, 
while B invites only one witness either from the Green or the Blue group. Since there is a 
tradeoff between inviting Greens for informational gains and inviting advocates, Reds or Blues, 
for political gains, the relative size of the marginal utility of one additional Green and that of one 
additional advocate will determine the equilibrium strategy for witness selection. Thus, I solve 
for the equilibrium by finding the number of Greens each committee member will invite in the 
equilibrium. 
The first step is to define the marginal probability of implementing a policy matching the 
state of nature by inviting an additional Green to a hearing. Let 𝑔𝑠, 𝑠 ∈ {0,1}, be the number of 
Greens recommending the policy that matches the true state of the world; and let 𝑔 − 𝑔𝑠 be the 
number of Greens that fail to do so. Since the principal considers messages only from the Green 
group useful, the probability of implementing a policy that matches the state of nature can be 
expressed as the following. 
If g is odd, 
𝑃(𝑥 = 𝑠| 𝐺) =∑ (
𝑔
𝑔𝑠







If g is even or zero, 
𝑃(𝑥 = 𝑠| 𝐺 ) =∑ [(
𝑔
𝑔𝑠














𝑃(𝑥 ≠ 𝑠| 𝐺) ≡ 1 − 𝑝 
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The marginal probability of implementing a correct policy by inviting the nth number of 
one additional Green witness can be expressed as ∆𝑃(𝑛) such that 
                           ∆𝑃(𝑛) ≡ 𝑃(𝑥 = 𝑠| 𝑔 = 𝑛) − 𝑃(𝑥 = 𝑠| 𝑔 = 𝑛 − 1).              (4) 
As aforementioned, in the equilibrium, the total number of Greens invited will be either 
one or three, not two. Thus, when only one Green witness is invited, the probability of 
implementing a policy that matches the true state is equal to θ; and the marginal effect compared 
to the case without any Greens is θ -.5 because the principal without Greens’ messages still has 
50% chances of choosing a policy matching the state. When three Green witnesses are invited, 
the probability increases to −2𝜃3+3𝜃2.7 So, the marginal effect compared to having third 
additional Green is −2𝜃3+3𝜃2 − 𝜃. Formally,   
𝑃(𝑥 = 𝑠|𝑔 = 1) = 𝜃 
∆𝑃(1) = 𝜃 − .5 
𝑃(𝑥 = 𝑠|𝑔 = 3) = −2𝜃3 + 3𝜃2 
∆𝑃(3) = −2𝜃3 + 3𝜃2 − 𝜃. 
Using these values, Table A1 presents expected payoffs for committee members given 
their choice of witnesses. Note that the effect of inviting Greens equally rewards both committee 
members, but the utility of inviting an advocate, Red or Blue, is granted only to the 
corresponding member. For simpler notation, I use 
                                𝜆 ≡ (1 −
1
2






)𝜃2(1 − 𝜃) = −2𝜃3+3𝜃2 
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Table A1. Payoffs for committee members from the selection of witnesses 
R member | B member Green Blue 
Green-Green (−2𝜃3 + 3𝜃2)𝜆 
(−2𝜃3 + 3𝜃2)𝜆 
θλ 
θλ+q 
Green-Red θλ + q 
θλ 
θλ + q 
θλ + q 
Red-Red θλ + 2q 
θλ 
.5λ + 2q 
.5λ + q 
*Upper entry of each cell is payoffs for R member; lower entry is for B member. 
*Note that the cost of hearing (c) has not been subtracted from each payoff because it is not 
necessary for solving the equilibrium strategies of witness selection once a hearing is held. 
However, it will be subtracted from the expected utility for solving the chair’s choice of holding 
a hearing in the next section.    
 
Grandstanding equilibrium (No Greens: NG)  
First, there exists an equilibrium where g=0. Given that B invites a Blue, R will invite two Reds 
if .5λ + 2q ≥ θλ + q. Likewise, when R invites two Reds, B will invite a Blue if .5λ + q ≥ θλ. 
Both conditions are the same. Therefore, both committee members will not invite any Green 
witnesses if the following condition is met.  
𝐸𝑈𝑖(𝑔𝑖 = 1| 𝑔~𝑖 = 0) ≤ 𝐸𝑈𝑖(𝑔𝑖
∗ = 0| 𝑔~𝑖 = 0) 
(𝜃 − .5)𝜆 ≤ 𝑞 
∆𝑃(1) ∗ 𝜆 ≤ 𝑞 
Fully informative equilibrium (All Greens: AG) 
Second, there exists an equilibrium where g = ω. Given that B invites a Green witness, R will 
also invite two Greens if (−2𝜃3 + 3𝜃2)𝜆 ≥ 𝜃𝜆 + 2𝑞. Also, when R invites two Greens, B will 
invite a Green if (−2𝜃3 + 3𝜃2)𝜆 ≥ 𝜃𝜆 + 𝑞. Therefore, the committee members will invite 
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witnesses only from the Green group when both conditions are satisfied. However, since the 
former is a stronger condition unless 𝑞 = 0, this equilibrium exists if 
𝐸𝑈𝑅(𝑔𝑅
∗ = 2|𝑔𝐵 = 1) ≥ 𝐸𝑈𝑅(𝑔𝑅 = 0| 𝑔𝐵 = 1) 




The following proves that the condition above is possible for certain range of q. 




Given q ≥ 0 and . 5 ≤ 𝜆 ≤ 1 because 𝜆 = (1 −
1
2
𝑑) and 0 ≤  𝑑 ≤  1, showing 
 ∆𝑃(3) ≥ 0 proves the existence of such q. 
∆𝑃(3) = −2𝜃3 + 3𝜃2 − 𝜃 
= −𝜃(𝜃 − 1)(2𝜃 − 1) 
Given . 5 < 𝜃 ≤ 1, if 𝜃 = 1, ∆𝑃(3) = 0; if 𝜃 ≠ 1, since  𝜃 > 0, (𝜃 − 1) < 0 and 




Partially informative equilibrium (Some Greens: SG) 
Third, I show that there exist equilibria where 0 < 𝑔 < 𝜔. As aforementioned, the total number 
of Green witnesses to be invited in an equilibrium strategy is either one or three because there is 
no marginal benefit of inviting two Green witnesses instead of one. Hence, the number of Greens 
in this type of equilibrium is one.   
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a. Some Greens 1 (SG1)   
There exists an equilibrium where R invites one Green and one Red while B invites one Blue 
(gR = 1 and gB = 0). Given that B invites a Blue, R will invite one Green and one Red, if 𝜃𝜆 +
𝑞 ≥  .5𝜆 + 2𝑞. Also, when R invites one Green and one Red, B will invite a Blue if 𝜃 ≤  𝜃 + 𝑞, 
which is always true. Thus, the equilibrium SG1 exists if (𝜃 − .5)𝜆 ≥  𝑞, which is same as 
∆𝑃(1) ∗ 𝜆 ≥ 𝑞.   
b. Some Greens 2 (SG2) 
There exists an equilibrium where R invites two Reds while B invites one Green (gR =
0 and gB = 1). When R invites two Reds, B will invite a Green if 𝜃𝜆 ≥  .5𝜆 + 𝑞 that is equal to 
∆𝑃(1) ∗ 𝜆 ≥ 𝑞. Also, when B invites a Green, R will select two Reds if 𝜃𝜆 + 2𝑞 ≥ (−2𝜃3 +
3𝜃2)𝜆, which is same as 𝑞 ≥
∆𝑃(3)
2
∗ 𝜆. Thus, the equilibrium exists when both conditions are 
met such that 
∆𝑃(3)
2
∗ 𝜆 ≤ 𝑞 ≤ ∆𝑃(1) ∗ 𝜆.   
Proof 2. There exists certain range of q such that 
∆𝑃(3)
2
∗ 𝜆 ≤ 𝑞 ≤ ∆𝑃(1) ∗ 𝜆. 
Given . 5 ≤ 𝜆 ≤ 1, showing 
∆𝑃(3)
2
≤ ∆𝑃(1) proves the existence of such q. 
1
2
(−2𝜃3 + 3𝜃2 − 𝜃) ≤ 𝜃 − .5 
0 ≤ 2𝜃3 − 3𝜃2 + 3𝜃 − 1 
0 ≤ 2 (𝜃 −
1
2
) (𝜃2 − 𝜃 + 1) 
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Since . 5 < 𝜃 ≤ 1, (𝜃 −
1
2
) > 0. Also, (θ2 − θ+ 1) > 0 because it is a convex function 




≤ ∆𝑃(1) is always true.  
Also, note that the equilibrium AG exists if 
∆𝑃(3)∗𝜆
2
≥ 𝑞 and the equilibrium SG1 exists if 
∆𝑃(1) ∗ 𝜆 ≥ 𝑞. Given this proof showing 
∆𝑃(3)
2
≤ ∆𝑃(1), we know that the equilibria AG and 
SG1 coexist if 
∆𝑃(3)∗𝜆
2
≥ 𝑞. The following proves that SG1 is Pareto-suboptimal to AG when 
they coexist. 
Proof 3. If 
∆𝑃(3)∗𝜆
2
≥ 𝑞, AG is Pareto-optimal and SG1 is a Pareto-suboptimal Nash 
Equilibrium.  
 In AG, 
𝐸𝑈𝑅(𝑔𝑅 = 2|𝑔𝐵 = 1) = 𝐸𝑈𝐵(𝑔𝐵 = 1|𝑔𝑅 = 2) = (−2𝜃
3 + 3𝜃2)𝜆. 
In SG1, 




∗ 𝜆 ≥ 𝑞 that is 
1
2
(−2𝜃3 + 3𝜃2 − 𝜃)𝜆 ≥ 𝑞, it is always true that  
𝐸𝑈𝑅(𝑔𝑅 = 2|𝑔𝐵 = 1) > 𝐸𝑈𝑅(𝑔𝑅 = 1|𝑔𝐵 = 0) 
(−2𝜃3 + 3𝜃2)𝜆 > 𝜃𝜆 + 𝑞 
(−2𝜃3 + 3𝜃2 − 𝜃)𝜆 > 𝑞. 
Figure 1A presents the equilibrium space for witness selection assuming 𝜃 = .8. 
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Figure 1A. Equilibria for Witness Selection and a Chair’s Hearing Decision 
With a Neutral Principal 
 
The graph is drawn assuming 𝜃 = .8. 
 
3. Hearing decision by a committee chair 
The chair holds a hearing if  
𝐸𝑈𝑖(𝑔𝑖
∗|𝑔~𝑖, ℎ
∗ = 1) > 𝐸𝑈𝑖(ℎ
∗ = 0) 
𝑝𝜆 + 𝑎𝑖 ∗ 𝑞 − 𝑐 > .5𝜆 
                                                    (𝑝 − .5)𝜆 + 𝑎𝑖 ∗ 𝑞 > 𝑐.                       (6) 
If (𝑝 − .5)𝜆 + 𝑎𝑖 ∗ 𝑞 = 𝑐, he randomizes his choice with .5 probability. Thus, a majority 
chair is more likely to hold a hearing than a minority chair if (𝑝 − .5)𝜆 + 𝑎𝑅 ∗ 𝑞 > (𝑝 − .5)𝜆 +
𝑎𝐵 ∗ 𝑞 which reduces to 𝑎𝑅 > 𝑎𝐵. This condition is satisfied either when R invites two advocates 
and B invites a Green (SG2) or when both invite only their advocates (NG). Therefore, R’s stronger 
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incentive to hold a hearing is mainly driven by his motivation to grandstand.  
These comparative statics generate an interesting implication. In the latter case, a 
majority chair is more likely to hold hearings for a grandstanding purpose than a minority chair. 
At the same time, however, a majority chair may help information transmission by holding a 
partially informative hearing (SG2) that a minority chair would not hold. In this sense, depending 
on the level of committee members’ policy disagreement and the benefit of grandstanding on a 
given issue, having a majority chair may or may not be desirable in terms of information 
transmission in legislative processes.  
However, the majority chair’s relatively higher incentive to hold a hearing in the 
expectation of SG2 may not be noticeable in practice because whenever SG2 is an equilibrium 
SG1 is also an equilibrium and both types of chairs are equally likely to hold a hearing when 
SG1 is expected in the witness selection stage. Indeed, in her lab experiment, Park (2017) finds 
that in the equilibrium space where both SG1 and SG2 are plausible, subjects showed a 
behavioral pattern that they played SG1 more frequently than SG2. As a result, the net effect of 
having a majority chair instead of a minority chair is likely to increase only the frequency of 
hearings characterized as grandstanding. Table A2 provides conditions under which each type of 
chairs decides to hold a hearing in the expectation of certain types of hearings. The entries of the 
table are computed assuming 𝑐 = .2 and 𝜃 = .8. to be consistent with Figure 1A, and note that 
𝑐 = .2 is the value used in the lab experiment of the previous study. 
Figure 1A also presents the point predictions of the chair’s hearing decisions. In most 
cases, both types of chairs hold a hearing, but there are two equilibrium spaces in which only a 
majority chair holds a hearing while a minority chair does not. One that is marked as (A) is when 
𝑞 <  .2 and NG is expected to be played in the witness selection stage, and the other marked as 
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(B) is when 0.67 > 𝑑 and SG2 is expected. Note that these two equilibrium spaces may increase 
or decrease as the cost of hearing changes (e.g. The sizes of both (A) and (B) increase if 𝑐 = .3.), 
but the theoretical implications remain the same. 
Table A2. Chairs’ Hearing Decisions with a Neutral Principal 
 
Expected Witness Selection R chair holds a hearing if …  B chair holds a hearing if … 
NG 𝑞 >  .1 𝑞 >  .2 
AG 𝑑 < .99 𝑑 < .99 
SG1 𝑞 > .15𝑑 − .1 𝑞 > .15𝑑 − .1 
SG2 𝑞 > .075𝑑 − .05 . 67 > 𝑑 
The utilities are calculated assuming 𝑐 = .2 and 𝜃 = .8 to be consistent with Figure 1A. If a chair is indifferent, he 
holds a hearing with .5 probability. 
 
 
Equilibrium Solution for the Model with a Biased Principal 
1. Policy decision by the principal 
The principal maximizes her expected utility by selecting one of the two policy 
alternatives (x) with equal probability of .5. If a hearing is not held, the expected utility of the 
principal from choosing policy 0 is .5 and that of choosing policy 1 is .5(1-d). Thus, the principal 
will always select the policy 0. However, if a hearing is held, she will select a policy with higher 
expected utility given the messages from the Green witnesses (G) and randomizes her choice if 
indifferent between alternative policies by choosing 𝑥 = 0 with .5 probability. The expected 
utility for each policy decision made after a hearing can be formally expressed as the following: 
             𝐸𝑈𝐹(𝑥 = 0|𝐺, ℎ
∗ = 1) = 𝑃(𝑠 = 0|𝐺) ∗ 1 + 𝑃(𝑠 = 1|𝐺) ∗ 0            (7) 
                    𝐸𝑈𝐹(𝑥 = 1|𝐺, ℎ
∗ = 1) = 𝑃(𝑠 = 0|𝐺) ∗ 0 + 𝑃(𝑠 = 1|𝐺) ∗ (1 − 𝑑).         (8) 
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Note that the principal’s expected utility of selecting policy 1 decreases as her level of 
policy bias (d) increases. Using the posterior belief functions as defined in the previous section, 
the principal selects policy 0 if and only if the following is satisfied: 
𝐸𝑈𝐹(𝑥 = 0|𝐺, ℎ
∗ = 1) > 𝐸𝑈𝐹(𝑥 = 1|𝐺, ℎ




)𝜃𝑔0  (1 − 𝜃)𝑔1 > (
𝑔
𝑔1




)(𝑔0−𝑔1) > 1 − 𝑑 
                             𝑑 > 1 − (
𝜃
1−𝜃




) >1 and 0 < 𝑑 ≤ 1, the condition above is always true if 𝑔0 ≥ 𝑔1 leading the 
principal to implement policy 0, which is consistent with the previous prediction for a neutral 
principal. However, now with a biased principal, it is possible that she chooses policy 0 even 
when 𝑔0 < 𝑔1 as long as d is large enough. For example, when θ=.8, 𝑔0 = 1 and 𝑔1 = 2, the 
principal will choose policy 0 if 𝑑 ≥
3
4
. Thus, the comparative statics imply that, as d increases, 
the probability of the principal choosing policy 0 increases. In other words, the more biased the 
principal is in favor of policy 0, the more likely she will choose that policy. For notational 
convenience, I will use a new term, φ, for the probability that the principal will choose policy 0 
even if 𝑔0 < 𝑔1. 
                          𝑃(𝑑 > 1 − (
𝜃
1−𝜃
)(𝑔0−𝑔1)|𝑔0 < 𝑔1) ≡ 𝜑                   (10) 
The size of φ is conditioned not only by the level of partisan disagreement (d) but also 
by how many Greens are invited in total (g) and the gap between the number of different 
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messages from them, (𝑔0 − 𝑔1). Thus, let 𝜑𝑔 denote the value of φ for a given number of Greens 
invited (g).   
Then, the equilibrium strategy of the principal if a hearing is held is as follows:  





 𝑥∗ = 0,                  𝑖𝑓 𝑔0 ≥ 𝑔1 𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑓 𝑑 > 1 − (
𝜃
1 − 𝜃
)(𝑔0−𝑔1) 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑔0 < 𝑔1
 𝑥∗ = 0        𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ .5 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝑑 = 1 − (
𝜃
1 − 𝜃
)(𝑔0−𝑔1) 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑔0 < 𝑔1
𝑥∗ = 1,                                                             𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.                                        
 
(Proposition PD-Bias) Given that the principal is biased in favor of policy 0 by d, if a hearing is 
not held, the principal always selects policy 0. If a hearing is held, she selects policy 0, if 𝑔0 ≥
𝑔1, or if 𝑔0 < 𝑔1 and 𝑑 > 1 − (
𝜃
1−𝜃
)(𝑔0−𝑔1); and policy 1, otherwise. However, if she is 
indifferent about choosing either of the policies, she randomizes her choice with .5 probability. 
As the level of bias (d) increases, she is more likely to choose policy 0.  
As a result, as the principal is more biased, the probability of implementing a policy that 
matches the state (s) increases if the state is 𝑠 = 0 but decreases if the state is 𝑠 = 1. Given that p 
represents the probability for a neutral principal to implement a policy matching the state, this 
probability for a biased principal is modified as the following:  
                                 𝑃(𝑥 = 𝑠|𝑠 = 0, 𝐺) = 𝑝 + (1 − 𝑝)𝜑                    (11) 
                                 𝑃(𝑥 = 𝑠|𝑠 = 1, 𝐺) = 𝑝(1 − 𝜑).                           (12) 
2. Witness selection by committee members 
Since the probability of implementing a policy that matches the true state has changed, 
the expected utilities of the committee members have to be modified accordingly.   
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𝐸𝑈𝑖 = 𝐸(𝑢𝑖(𝑥, 𝑠)) + 𝑞 ∗ 𝑎𝑖 − 𝑐  for 𝑖 ∈ {𝑅, 𝐵} 






{𝑝 + (1 − 𝑝)𝜑 + 𝑝(1 − 𝜑)(1 − 𝑑)}






                                            (13) 






[{𝑝 + (1 − 𝑝)𝜑}(1 − 𝑑) + 𝑝(1 − 𝜑)]






.                               (14) 
Thus, given 𝑃(𝑥 = 𝑠|𝑔 = 1) = 𝜃, 𝑃(𝑥 = 𝑠|𝑔 = 3) = −2𝜃3 + 3𝜃2, and (1 −
1
2
𝑑) =  𝜆, 




𝐸(𝑢𝑅(𝑥, 𝑠)|𝑔 = 3) = (−2𝜃








𝐸(𝑢𝐵(𝑥, 𝑠)|𝑔 = 3) = (−2𝜃




The arguments above can be solved further by fixing θ at a certain value because, then, 
the size of φ can be calculated depending on the level of disagreement on policy (d) and the 





Calculation of the probability 𝝋𝒈  
Assuming 𝜃 = .8, 𝜑 = 𝑃(𝑑 ≥ 1 − (
𝜃
1−𝜃
)(𝑔0−𝑔1)|𝑔0 < 𝑔1) takes conditional values as follows:  
a) If g=1, it is always true that 𝑔1 − 𝑔0 = 1 given 𝑔1 > 𝑔0. 
𝜑1 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑑 ≥
3
4
    
 0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.
 
b) If g =2, it is always true that 𝑔1 − 𝑔0 = 2 given 𝑔1 > 𝑔0. 
𝜑2 = {
1,   𝑖𝑓 𝑑 ≥
15
16
   
  0,   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.  
 
c) If g =3, then 𝑔1 − 𝑔0 = 1 𝑜𝑟 3 given 𝑔1 > 𝑔0.   
If 𝑔1 − 𝑔0 = 1, 
𝜑3 = {




   0,   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.
 
            If 𝑔1 − 𝑔0 = 3, 
𝜑3 = {




  0,   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.
 
In summary, if 𝑑 <
3
4
, 𝜑1 = 𝜑2 = 𝜑3 = 0 regardless of the number of Greens (g) and 
their messages (𝑔𝑚). Likewise, if 𝑑 ≥
63
64






, 𝜑1 = 1 and 












, the size of 𝜑3 varies 
depending on 𝑔𝑚 such that 𝜑3 = 1 if 𝑔1 − 𝑔0 = 1; 𝜑3 = 0 if 𝑔1 − 𝑔0 = 3. Assuming that 
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committee members are aware of this contingency and take it into account when making 
decisions, I further clarify the expected size of 𝜑3 as the following: 
P(𝑔1 − 𝑔0 = 1 |𝑔 = 3) =
1
2







) 𝜃𝑔0  (1 − 𝜃)𝑔1 + (
𝑔
𝑔1







) . 8 (1 −. 8)2 + (
3
2
) . 82 (1 − .8)} ≡ 𝑥 
P(𝑔1 − 𝑔0 = 3 |𝑔 = 3) =
1
2







) (1 −. 8)3 + (
3
3
) . 83} ≡ 𝑦 














, 𝜑3 is 1 with .48 probability when 𝑔1 − 𝑔0 =
1; and 0 with .52 probability when 𝑔1 − 𝑔0 = 3. Then, the expected size of 𝜑3 under this 
condition will be .48 as shown below: 






) =  .48 ∗ 1 + .52 ∗ 0 = .48. 
Therefore, the equilibrium of witness selection is a non-linear function of d such that 
there will be cut-points at 
3
4
 if g=1; at 
15
16

















Table A3 below presents expected payoffs for each of the committee members.  
Table A3. Payoffs for committee members from the selection of witnesses 
R member | B member Green Blue 
Green-Green 𝐸(𝑢𝑅(𝑥, 𝑠)|𝑔 = 3) 
𝐸(𝑢𝐵(𝑥, 𝑠)|𝑔 = 3) 
𝐸(𝑢𝑅(𝑥, 𝑠)|𝑔 = 1) 
𝐸(𝑢𝐵(𝑥, 𝑠)|𝑔 = 1)+q 
Green-Red 𝐸(𝑢𝑅(𝑥, 𝑠)|𝑔 = 1) +q 
𝐸(𝑢𝐵(𝑥, 𝑠)|𝑔 = 1) 
𝐸(𝑢𝑅(𝑥, 𝑠)|𝑔 = 1) +q 
𝐸(𝑢𝐵(𝑥, 𝑠)|𝑔 = 1) +q 
Red-Red 𝐸(𝑢𝑅(𝑥, 𝑠)|𝑔 = 1) +2q 





Upper entry of each cell is the payoff for R; lower entry is for B. Note that the cost of hearing (c) has not been 
subtracted from each of the payoffs in this table because it is not necessary for solving the equilibrium strategies of 
witness selection once a hearing is held.  
As in the model with a neutral principal, there are three types of pure-strategy Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium.   
Grandstanding equilibrium (No Greens: NGBias)  
(Proposition NG-Bias) Both R and B members do not invite any Green witnesses if 𝑞 ≥ 𝑡2. 
For an equilibrium where nobody invites Greens to exist, the following two conditions 
have to be satisfied:   
𝐸𝑈𝑅(𝑔𝑅
∗ = 0| 𝑔𝐵 = 0) ≥ 𝐸𝑈𝑅(𝑔𝑅 = 1| 𝑔𝐵 = 0) 




𝑞 ≥ (1 − 𝜑1) (𝜃𝜆 −
1
2
) ≡ 𝑡1, and 
𝐸𝑈𝐵(𝑔𝐵
∗ = 0| 𝑔𝑅 = 0) ≥ 𝐸𝑈𝐵(𝑔𝐵 = 1| 𝑔𝑅 = 0) 
(1 − 𝑑)
2






𝑞 ≥ (1 − 𝜑1) (𝜃𝜆 −
1 − 𝑑
2
) ≡ 𝑡2. 
Since d > 0, 𝑡2 > 𝑡1. Thus, the second argument addressing B’s strategy serves as a 
stronger condition for this equilibrium to exist. Therefore, both committee members will not 
invite any Green witnesses if 𝑡2 ≤ 𝑞. 
Also, the comparative statics suggests several interesting points. First of all, for the 
given political value of inviting an advocate, q, the equilibrium becomes more likely as θ 
decrease and as d increases.8 The implication is that committee members tend to grandstand in a 
hearing as Greens’ messages are less accurate; as the principal is more biased; and as the 
members have more divergent interests over a policy. Likewise, for the given values of θ and d, 
the equilibrium becomes more likely as q increases, which suggests that committee members 
tend to hold a stage-managed hearing as they have larger political interest by doing so.  
Fully informative hearing (All Greens: AGBias) 
(Proposition AG-Bias) Both R and B invite witnesses only from the Green group if 𝑞 ≤ 𝑡3.  
Second, there is an equilibrium where both committee members invite Green witnesses 
only if the following two conditions are satisfied: 
𝐸𝑈𝑅(𝑔𝑅
∗ = 2|𝑔𝐵 = 1) ≥ 𝐸𝑈𝑅(𝑔𝑅 = 0| 𝑔𝐵 = 1) 
1
2
[{(−2𝜃3 + 3𝜃2)(1 − 𝜑3) − 𝜃(1 − 𝜑1)}𝜆 +
𝜑3 − 𝜑1
2
] ≥ 𝑞, 𝑎𝑛𝑑  
𝐸𝑈𝐵(𝑔𝐵
∗ = 1|𝑔𝑅 = 2) ≥ 𝐸𝑈𝐵(𝑔𝐵 = 0| 𝑔𝑅 = 2) 
 
8 Note 𝜆 = 1 −
𝑑
2











[{(−2𝜃3 + 3𝜃2)(1 − 𝜑3) − 𝜃(1 − 𝜑2)}𝜆 +
(𝜑3 − 𝜑2)(1 − 𝑑)
2
] ≥ 𝑞. 






≤ 𝑑, the arguments above are reduced as 
the following, respectively: 
𝑞 ≤
∆𝑃(3) ∗ 𝜆(1 − 𝜑)
2
≡ 𝑡3    𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝑞 ≤ ∆𝑃(3) ∗ 𝜆(1 − 𝜑). 
It shows that the former condition defining R’s strategy is a stronger condition than the 
latter. Therefore, there is an equilibrium All Greens (AG) if the former holds, and I label the 
upper bound for q as 𝑡3.  
If θ =.8, for example, the equilibrium exists either when 𝑑 <
3
4
 or when 
63
64
≤ 𝑑 and q = 0 













, the equilibrium AG does not exist.  
First, assume that the second condition that defines B’s strategy is more binding, and it 








Again, for further solution, I assume 𝜃 = .8. Then, 𝜑1 = 1, 𝜑2 = 0, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸(𝜑3) = .48. 
The condition above reduces to 𝑑 < 1.875 which is always true since 0 < 𝑑 ≤ 1. Therefore, the 
second condition addressing B’s strategy serves as a stronger condition and it becomes −.047 −
38 
 
.036𝑑 ≥ 𝑞. However, since 0 ≤ 𝑞 by assumption, the condition does not hold in any case. Thus, 

















) (𝜑1 − 𝜑2) >
(𝜑2−𝜑3)𝑑
2
 reduces to d < 0, which is false. Thus, it leads to a conclusion 
that R’s equilibrium condition is stronger than B’s. R’s condition is . 103 − .117𝑑 ≥ 𝑞. 
However, even when 𝑑 =
15
16
, the right-hand side becomes negative, -.007. Since 0 ≤ 𝑞 by 








Partially informative equilibrium (Some Greens: SGBias) 
(Proposition SG1-Bias) R member invites one Green and one Red and B does not invite any 
Green if 𝑞 ≤ 𝑡1. 
(Proposition SG2-Bias) B invites one Green and R does not invite any Greens if 𝑡3 ≤ 𝑞 ≤ 𝑡2. 
First, I consider the equilibrium SG1. The equilibrium exists if both of the following two 
conditions are satisfied: 
𝐸𝑈𝑅(𝑔𝑅
∗ = 1|𝑔𝐵 = 0) ≥ 𝐸𝑈𝑅(𝑔𝑅 = 0| 𝑔𝐵 = 0) 
(1 − 𝜑1) (𝜃𝜆 −
1
2
) ≥ 𝑞,      𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝐸𝑈𝐵(𝑔𝐵
∗ = 0|𝑔𝑅 = 1) ≥ 𝐸𝑈𝐵(𝑔𝐵 = 1| 𝑔𝑅 = 1) 
θ𝜆(1 − 𝜑1) +
𝜑1(1 − 𝑑)
2






I further solve the equilibrium assuming θ=.8. Note that the first condition for R player 




 or 𝑑 ≥
15
16
, then 𝜑1 = 𝜑2, the argument reduces to 𝑞 ≥ 0 which is always true. Thus, the 
equilibrium SG1 exists when the first condition 𝑡1 ≥ 𝑞 is satisfied for the given the range of d. 
However, if 𝑑 ≥
15
16
, 𝑡1 = 0 because 𝜑1 = 1. Therefore, SG1 exists only when q = 0 if 𝑑 ≥
15
16
.   






 , then 𝜑1 = 1 and 𝜑2 = 0. Thus, 𝑡1 = 0, and the first 
condition reduces to 0 ≥ 𝑞, which suggests that R selects one Green in this case only when q = 
0. However, the second condition reduces to 𝑞 ≥ 𝑑 (
1−𝜃
2
) + (𝜃 −
1
2
), and the right-hand side is a 
non-zero positive value because 𝑑 > 0 and . 5 < 𝜃 < 1. Therefore, since there is no q that 







Second, the equilibrium SG2 exists if the following two conditions are satisfied: 
𝐸𝑈𝑅(𝑔𝑅
∗ = 0|𝑔𝐵 = 1) ≥ 𝐸𝑈𝑅(𝑔𝑅 = 2| 𝑔𝐵 = 1) 
𝜃(1 − 𝜑1)𝜆 +
𝜑1
2





∗ = 1|𝑔𝑅 = 0) ≥ 𝐸𝑈𝐵(𝑔𝐵 = 0| 𝑔𝑅 = 0) 
𝑞 ≤ (1 − 𝜑1) (𝜃𝜆 −
1 − 𝑑
2
) = 𝑡2. 






≤ 𝑑, 𝜑1 = 𝜑3. Then, the first condition reduces to 𝑞 ≥ 𝑡3. The second 






≤ 𝑑, then 𝜑1 = 𝜑3 = 1 so that 𝑡2 = 𝑡3 = 0. Therefore, the equilibrium exists 







 ,then 𝜑1 = 1 and E(𝜑3) = .48. Note that 𝜆 = 1 −
𝑑
2
.    
For R member to invite no Greens, 
𝐸𝑈𝑅(𝑔𝑅
∗ = 0|𝑔𝐵 = 1) ≥ 𝐸𝑈𝑅(𝑔𝑅 = 2| 𝑔𝐵 = 1) 
θ(1 − 𝜑1)𝜆 +
𝜑1
2




𝑞 ≥ .103 − .117𝑑. 
For B member to invite a Green, 
𝐸𝑈𝐵(𝑔𝐵
∗ = 1|𝑔𝑅 = 0) ≥ 𝐸𝑈𝐵(𝑔𝐵 = 0| 𝑔𝑅 = 0) 
𝑞 ≤ (1 − 𝜑1)(𝜃𝜆 −
1 − 𝑑
2
) = 𝑡2 
𝑞 ≤ 0. 
Since 0 ≤ 𝑞, for B to invite a Green, q has to be 0. For both conditions to be met, 𝑑 ≥
22
25












, it exists for q=0.  
3. Hearing decision by the committee chair 
The chair holds a hearing if the following condition is satisfied: 
𝐸𝑈𝑖(𝑔𝑖
∗|𝑔~𝑖, ℎ
∗ = 1) > 𝐸𝑈𝑖(ℎ
∗ = 0) 
                                      𝑝𝜆(1 − 𝜑) +
𝜑
2
+ 𝑎𝑅 ∗ 𝑞 − .5 > 𝑐     𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑅                       (15) 
                                      𝑝𝜆(1 − 𝜑) +
𝜑(1−𝑑)
2
+ 𝑎𝐵 ∗ 𝑞 −
1−𝑑
2
> 𝑐     𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐵               (16) 
and randomizes by holding a hearing with .5 probability if indifferent.  
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A majority chair is more likely to hold a hearing than a majority chair if the left-hand side 
of (15) is greater than that of (16) so that 2𝑞(𝑎𝑅 − 𝑎𝐵) > 𝑑(1 − 𝜑). 
 
Note: For Table 2 which assumes 𝒄 =. 𝟐 and 𝜽 =. 𝟖, the following holds:   
1) If NG, 𝑝 = .5, 𝜑 = 1, 𝑎𝑅 = 2, and 𝑎𝐵 = 1. 
2) If AG, 𝑝 = .896, 𝜑 = 0, 𝑎𝑅 = 0, and 𝑎𝐵 = 0 if 𝑑 < .75; 𝐸(𝜑) = .48 if . 75 < 𝑑 <
63/64; φ = 1 if 63/64 < 𝑑. However, note that AG is not played if 𝑑 > .75. 
3) If SG1, 𝑝 = .8, 𝜑 = 0, 𝑎𝑅 = 1, and 𝑎𝐵 = 1 if 𝑑 < .75; 𝜑 = 1 otherwise. However, note 
that SG1 is not played if 𝑑 > .75 
4) If SG2, 𝑝 = .8, 𝜑 = 0, 𝑎𝑅 = 2, and 𝑎𝐵 = 0 if 𝑑 < .75; 𝜑 = 1 otherwise. However, note 
that SG2 is not played if 𝑑 > .75 
 
 
 
